The Impact of Locating Production Abroad on Activities at Home by Kleinert, Jörn & Toubal, Farid
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät 
der Eberhard-Karls-Universität Tübingen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Impact of Locating Production Abroad 
on Activities at Home 
 
 
Jörn Kleinert 
Farid Toubal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tübinger Diskussionsbeitrag Nr. 314 
November 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftliches Seminar 
Mohlstrasse 36, D-72074 Tübingen 
 
 
The Impact of Locating Production Abroad
on Activities at Home: Evidence from German
Firm-Level Data ?
Jo¨rn Kleinert a and Farid Toubal b
Abstract
We analyze whether firms that establish their first affiliate in a foreign coun-
try have a different pattern of growth in output, employment, capital and
productivity than firms that remain national. We use firm-level data on Ger-
man multinational activities and appropriate matching techniques to compare
the performance of German multinational firms with their national counter-
parts. We do not find a negative effect of firm’s decision to establish a foreign
affiliate on growth in its employment at home. There is also no significant
effect of the internationalization decision of German firms on other measures
of activities at home.
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1 Introduction
The rapid engagement of German firms in Eastern European countries has
received a lot of attention in German medias. It has been often argued that
this internationalization process might explain the slow down of economic
growth in Germany and the increase in unemployment. This view contrasts
with the empirical picture presented in Becker et al. (2005). They show that
the expansion of foreign activities of German firms has been accompanied by
an increase in these firms output and employment in Germany. Becker et al.
(2005) report that the increase of 56% in employment of German multinational
firms’ foreign affiliates has gone along with an increase of 50% in domestic
employment of German multinational firms between 1996 and 2001.
From a theoretical point of view, it is not clear whether engaging in produc-
tion abroad should have a positive or a negative effect on a firm’s activities
at home. According to Hanson et al. (2005), the positive or negative correla-
tion depends on the degree of complementarity between foreign and domestic
stages of production. If foreign production substitutes partly domestic stages
of production, then engaging in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) reduces firm’s
domestic activity. However, many foreign activities aim at enlarging the mar-
ket of domestic firms. In this case, foreign and domestic productions share
complementarities.
Moreover, increasing activities abroad might effect firm’s productivity at least
for three reasons. First, the relocation of production stages might increase
productivity through a better allocation of resources. Second, specialization
might increase productivity through scale economies and/or learning. Third,
activities abroad might expose the firm to new technologies, ideas and knowl-
edge which can be used at home as well. For all of these reasons, sales of
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the firm increase. This raises factor demand which may overcompensated the
reduction in factor demand which stems from the relocation of production
stages to the foreign country.
In this paper, we use detailed firm-data to analyze whether the internation-
alization of German firms has altered their activities at home. We compare
activities of firm that have engaged in FDI (henceforth, multinational firms)
to activities of domestic firm that do not have affiliates abroad (henceforth,
national firms). Yet, activities of national and multinational firms are not eas-
ily comparable since the group of multinational firms is not a random draw
from the whole population of firms. According to Helpman et al. (2004), a
firm self-selects into this group when it reaches a certain threshold level of
productivity. National and multinational firms differ thus ex-ante. Differences
in their performance can therefore not only be related to their international-
ization decision.
We tackle this problem by applying a matching approach. We identify all
national firms that become multinational in our sample period and find their
closest neighbors among the group of national firms that do not switch. There-
fore, switchers and their closest neighbors do not differ ex-ante. The differences
in their ex-post performance can be directly related to their foreign activities.
We combine this matching approach with a difference in difference estimation
methodology proposed by Heckman et al. (1997). This estimation method-
ology allows comparing the change in performances of a switcher with the
change in performances of a national firm during the sample period.
The combination of both techniques to analyze the effect of locating produc-
tion abroad on firm-level performance at home has been used in the empirical
literature before. Barba Navaretti and Castellani (2003) do not find a nega-
tive effect of the decision of Italian firms to locate production abroad on their
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domestic employment. This result is also found by Hijzen et al. (2006) using
French firm-level data. Both papers report a significant and positive effect of
becoming a multinational firm on domestic productivity and on employment
of these firms. Egger and Pfaffermayr (2003) have investigated the channel
through which this increased productivity might have occurred. They show
in a study of Austrian firms that investing abroad has a positive impact on
investment in intangible assets and on R&D. Finally, Barba Navaretti et al.
(2006), analyzing the behavior of French and Italian firms, differentiate the
impact of locating their production abroad according to the countries of desti-
nation. They do not find any evidence for a negative effect of FDI in developing
countries on activities at home.
Using the same methodology and German firm-level data, we also find a posi-
tive effect on domestic employment performance for firms that become multi-
nationals. However, we argue that this result might be partly driven by an
unappropriate matching technique. Comparing as in the previous literature a
switcher active in the textile industry in 1998 to a local firm active in machin-
ery and equipment in 2002 is obviously not convincing even if the algorithm
finds that the latter is the closest match with respect to all observable char-
acteristics including time and sector dummies. We propose therefore a novel
methodology that allows to control for the panel structure of our data. We
split the sample into eighty sector-year combinations to make sure, that the
matched national firms are active in the same industry and are compared in
the same year. This matching technique takes thereby into account also effects
that can be related to business cycles and market structure.
Controlling for these effects allows estimating an unbiased impact of the loca-
tion of production abroad on firm-level domestic performances. We do not find
any significant impact of locating production abroad on firm-level employment
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as it is taken for granted in the public debate.
This paper has four additional sections. In Section 2, we discuss the rational
behind the effect of locating production abroad on firm-level domestic perfor-
mance. In Section 3, we explain the estimation methodologies. In Section 4,
we present and discuss the results. We conclude in Section 5.
2 Theoretical Background
The theoretical literature on FDI views multinational firms as the integration
of different functions that can be separated and located in different countries.
The firm is represented by a production or a cost function that describes a
process of at most three stages that leads to the production of one single good.
The economy is described by a static framework without productivity changes.
The reallocation of production stages in the foreign country necessarily yield a
reduction of firm-level employment at home, when firms that relocate are ver-
tical in nature. In horizontal firm models, foreign affiliate production replaces
exports and reduces the labor demanded by the parent firms at home. In both
cases, more labor might be necessary to coordinate the activities at the level
of the headquarter but these gains in employment can not fully compensate
for the losses at the production stages.
Yet, the relocation of some stages of production in foreign countries does not
necessarily reduce value added of a firm at home. Suppose for example a firm
relocates a production stage which accounts for 15% of the value added to a
foreign affiliate. All else equal, this reduces its value added at home by 15%.
But let the relocation reduce the price of the good produced by the firm by 5%.
Suppose the price elasticity of demand is 3 at home and 4 in other countries.
Suppose further, that the firm exports half of its output. Falling prices yield
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17.5% higher demand of the good which yields 14.875% higher value added at
home. Higher demand for the good which is induced by the lower price almost
compensates for the 15% loss of value added at home due to the relocation
of production in this example. The gains might be much higher, if the lower
prices allow for instance to enter a new export market. Thus, value added and
therefore employment does not need to fall in reaction to the relocation of
production.
That is even more true if the benchmark is a different one. Suppose the firm
has decided not to relocate production to the foreign countries but a com-
petitor did. Increased price competition would lead to falling market shares of
the non-relocating firm. Hence, value added and employment fall. Some firms
might even exit the market. Compared to this benchmark, positive effects of
relocation of production are more likely.
There are also other kinds of activities abroad than production. Many firms
invest abroad to expand in foreign markets. About a third of all foreign affil-
iates of German multinational firms, for instance, are classified in retail and
wholesale. Investments abroad in these activities directly increases activities
at home. Similarly, investment in other service sectors abroad, such as business
services or finance might be export enhancing activities.
We look at effects of a firm’s engagement abroad on its own activities at home.
That allows to evaluate the average effects of relocations with respect to the
acting firm. It does not include effects on competitors and general equilibrium
effects through changes in aggregate income. We therefore abstain from any
welfare considerations.
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3 Econometric Methodology
The aim of the analysis is to estimate the average (treatment) effect of switch-
ing to foreign production on a firm’s performance at home, defined as
ATE = E (Y |D = 1)− E (Y |D = 0) (1)
The outcome variable Y represents the firm’s domestic outcome: employment,
investment and output. While D = 1 indicates that the firm has switched to
become a multinational, D = 0 indicates that the firm has not switched. The
average treatment effect ATE in equation (1) is the difference between the
performance paths of a switcher and the analogous outcome of the same firm
if it would have chosen to remain national. Of course, this is not observable.
Thus, we need to find an approximation for the unobservable performance
outcome Y |D = 0. The main problem is to estimate equation (1) with a
random sample on Y and D, where D is a dummy variable that contains the
information whether the firm is a multinational or a national firm if, as in our
case, D is not independent of Y .
3.1 Estimation Strategy
The matching technique is a way of construct this missing counterfactual
by drawing comparisons conditional on a vector X of observable firm-level
characteristics. The underlying assumption for the validity of the procedure
is that conditional on the observable characteristics, the treated (switching
firms) and non-treated firms (those remaining national) would exhibit a similar
performance under the same circumstances.
Let the subscripts 0 and 1 indicate the time before and after switching, re-
spectively. The matching approach yields unbiased estimates, if the switch-
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ing is independent of the mean of the outcome Y , or E(Y0|D) = E(Y0) and
E(Y1|D) = E(Y1). To see this, we rewrite equation (1):
E (Y |D = 1)− E (Y |D = 0)=E (Y0|D = 1)− E (Y0|D = 0) (2)
+E(Y1 − Y0|D = 1)
= [E (Y0|D = 1)− E (Y0|D = 0)] + ATT
ATT stands for the average treatment effect on the treated, i.e. the switch-
ing firms. That is exactly the difference we are interested in. However, mean
independence is a strong assumption. Firm self-select into the group of multi-
national firms on the basis of criteria that are not independent of our outcome
Y . Hence, D and Y are not independent as necessary for equation (2) to de-
liver an unbiased estimator for the ATT. Fortunately, we can find observable
characteristics, X, to wipe out the correlation between D and Y . If the vari-
ables in X determine switching, Y is mean independent of D, conditional on
X (Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)).
E (Y1 − Y0|D,X) = (E (Y1|D = 1, X)− E (Y0|D = 0, X)) (3)
− (E (Y0|D = 1, X)− E (Y0|D = 0, X))
The second difference in equation (3) is the selection bias from above, which is
assumed to be zero conditional on X. It represents the difference between the
outcome of multinational firms, before they have switched, and those firms
that remained national firms. If the selection bias represented by the second
term is zero for given realizations of the vector X, then we are left with only
the partial effect of switching. In other words, the difference in performance
between multinational firms and the selected control group of national firms
is a consistent estimate of the causal effect under the matching assumption.
Hence, if our matching process is successful, we can give a causal interpretation
to the average performance difference between treatment and control firms.
A negligible selection bias requires the ex-ante difference in performances of
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switching firms and control group firms to be small. Thus, we look for twins
of each switching firm among all domestic firms that have not switched. By
twin, we mean a firm that has very similar characteristics along all observable
criteria. We can then compare the ex-post performance of the switching firm
with those of the twin national firm that has not switched.
3.2 Data
In order to build both groups, we merge information from two databases.
The first one, the MiDi (MIcro data base Direct Investment), contains panel
information on the foreign activity of German multinational firm since 1996.
The second one, Dafne contains information on the balance sheet and income
statement of 50,018 German firms since the early eighties.
We start by coding all firm that establish their first foreign affiliate from
the firm-level Midi database of the Deutsche Bundesbank (see Lipponer, 2002
for a comprehensive description of the database). MiDi provides a detailed
breakdown of the foreign assets and liabilities of German multinational firms
abroad. German foreign direct investment is defined as the direct or indirect
ownership or control by a single German entity of at least ten percent of the
voting securities of an incorporated foreign firm or the equivalent interest in an
unincorporated foreign firm. The database comprise information on all foreign
affiliates of German multinational firms from 1996 to 2004.
We find 936 switching firms over the period 1997-2003. Unfortunately, only
402 of them are included in the Dafne database. 1 Dafne holds information on
the year of establishment of the firm, several categories of its assets, its sales,
profits, expenses and the number of employees. To these variables we add the
1About 30% of the German parent firms in the MiDi database are also listed in
the Dafne database.
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information whether a firm is a (i) multinational over the whole period or a
(ii) national firm over the whole period or a (iii) firm that switches during
the period. Dafne does not cover all information for each firm every year.
Table 1 summarizes information on the number of national, switchers and
multinational firms in our sample for each year between 1997 and 2003.
Table 1
Number of switchers
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Switchers 44 48 67 85 76 46 36
Multinationals 547 647 862 978 1169 1612 1749
National firms 3220 4846 7518 8174 11062 20777 26835
In sum, our sample covers information on 2,766 multinational firms. The con-
trol group has been constructed from a large set of 47,252 German national
firms. On average, national firms, switchers, and multinational firms have dif-
ferent characteristics. In terms of factor input for instance, multinational firms
are larger than switchers which are themselves larger than national firms. Ta-
ble A1 in Appendix provides some descriptive statistics.
3.3 Propensity Score Matching
As argued above switching is not random. We therefore construct a control
group with includes firms that have the same characteristics as the switchers
to minimize the differences in observed heterogeneity among both groups.
The matching approach requires comparing switching firms and national firms
across a number of observable pre-switching characteristics. It is desirable to
perform the matching on the basis of a single index that captures all the
information from the vector X of observable characteristics to reduce the
dimensionality problem. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) have shown that all
the information of the observable variables in the X vector is included in one
propensity score when using a probit estimation. The same applies to a logit
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estimation. We use the probability to be a multinational firm as matching
criteria. The endogenous variable in our logit estimation is one if a firm is a
multinational firm in a particular year and a zero otherwise. We use profits,
age, age squared, employment, physical capital, and the debt equity ratio of the
firm and sector and year dummies to predict whether a firm is a multinational
or not. The results of the logit model are given in Table 2.
Table 2
Probability to be a multinational firm
Variable Coefficient Robust
Std.Error
ln(profit) 0.037*** 0.011
ln(output) 0.039 0.044
age 0.004* 0.002
age2 1.42 10−6 9.07 10−6
ln(physical capital) 0.713*** 0.034
ln(fixed assets) -0.418*** 0.032
debt-equity ratio -0.001 0.001
ln(wage bill) 0.154*** 0.052
Observations 68072
Pseudo R2 0.42
We use the estimated coefficients to predict the probability of a firm to become
multinational and match switchers and non-switcher according to this propen-
sity. For the matching, we can chose between three different methodologies:
nearest neighbor matching, kernel matching, and local linear regressions. In
simulation studies, kernel matching (KM) and local linear regressions (LLR)
outperform nearest neighbor matching approaches (Fro¨hlich, 2004). This is
particularly the case when the control group is large, as in our case. The KM
and LLR techniques use the whole distribution of firms’ performance instead
of an ex-ante defined subsample of the control group. Thereby, an endogenous
weight is given to each firm in the control group that depends on its dis-
tance from the treated (i.e. switching) firm. We present estimates from LLR
to compare our results to the studies using data from France and Italy.
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We also use the nearest neighbor methodology. We thereby always match one
switching firm to the three firms from the control group which are closest to the
switcher according to the propensity score, i.e. we use three nearest neighbor
matching. We decided to use three nearest neighbor matching because the
control group to our switchers is large enough to guarantee several very near
neighbor to each switching firm. Using three nearest neighbors reduces the
influence of outliers in the sample of the control group. We use three nearest
neighbor methodology additional to local linear regressions, because when
applying the nearest neighbor matching algorithms we can match switchers to
control group firms in 80 subsamples separately and recombine the subsamples
again afterwards. Thus, outcomes are compared for the same year and between
firm from the same sector.
3.4 Reliability of the Propensity Score Matching
The propensity score matching method provides a reliable and robust method
for estimating the effect of locating production abroad on domestic employ-
ment if, conditional on the propensity score, the potential outcomes Y0|D = 1
and Y0|D = 0 are independent of the incidence of switching. Under the as-
sumption of independence conditional on observable variables, the pre-investment
variables should be balanced between the multinational and the national firms.
We follow Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and Smith and Todd (2005) in veri-
fying whether the balancing condition is satisfied by the data.
We use two ways to show that conditional on the propensity score, the out-
comes Y are independent on the decision to switch. One way is to show that
switching firms and the firms in the control group are ex-ante not statisti-
cally different. To show that switching firms and firms in the control group
are not statistically different after matching, we compare various characteris-
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tics for equality of the means. The comparisons are given in Table A2 in the
Appendix.
The other way is to show that conditional on the propensity score (PS) the
dummy variable D containing the information whether a firm is a switcher
does not hold any information for the variables in the X vector. We test this
by regressing the propensity score, some polynomial of higher order, and the
interaction of the propensity score and a dummy variable (D) indicating a
switching firm on the variable of the X vector. We used regression (4) to test
for independence of the switching decision from the X vector variables.
xj = β0 + β1PS + β2(PS)
2 + β3(PS)
3 (4)
+ β4D + β5PS ∗D + β6(PS ∗D)2 + β7(PS ∗D)3 + η
xj denotes a variable from the vector X of observable characteristics. D takes
the value one if the firm is a switcher and zero otherwise. η denotes the error
term. The control group is properly chosen in the sense that the switching
decision is independent from the outcome variable y0 if the coefficients β4,
β5, β6 and, β7 are jointly insignificant. Table (3) reports the F values of joint
significance of the coefficients β4, β5, β6 and, β7 from regression 4 for the
variables xi from the X vector.
Table 3
Balancing Test: nearest neighbor matching
Matching 3 Nearest Neighbor Nearest Neighbor
F-Test F-Test
Variable (p-value) Balanced (p-value) Balanced
Profits 0.50 yes 0.79 yes
Output 0.60 yes 0.99 yes
Age 0.00 no 0.00 no
Age squared 0.05 no 0.00 no
Physical capital 0.13 yes 0.45 yes
Tangible assets 0.41 yes 0.30 yes
Debt equity ratio 0.92 yes 1.00 yes
Wage Bill 0.11 yes 0.88 yes
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Table 3 shows that our control group does not differ in observable charac-
teristics from the group of switching firms. With respect to the chosen firm
characteristics we have found twins to the group of switching firms. The par-
tial effect of switching is not biased by firm characteristics. Thus, both tests
indicate that the balancing condition is satisfied in our matched sample. The
propensity score specification we have chosen is effective in accounting for
factors that determine selection into the group of multinational firms.
3.5 Evaluation: Event Study and Difference in Difference Analysis
We follow the microeconomic evaluation literature (Heckman et al. (1997); De-
hejia and Wahba (2002)) and compare the average in the performance change
of the switchers and the non-switchers. We apply two approaches to estimate
the partial effect of switching on the performance of firms at home. First, we
use the event study technique and compare average differences in the perfor-
mance of the two groups after the event of switching.
βES = 1/Ni
∑
i
∆Yi − 1/Nj
∑
j
∆Yj (5)
∆Yi and ∆Yj stand for the growth rate of the performance measure after
switching for the switching firms and of firms from the control group, respec-
tively. Ni denotes the number of switching firms, Nj the number of firms in
the control group.
Second, we use a difference in difference estimator comparing average differ-
ences in pre- and post-event performances of both groups. This techniques
requires more information on the status of the firm before it switches. How-
ever, the difference in difference analysis controls for unobserved heterogeneity.
Having controlled for the non-random switching decision, unobserved hetero-
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geneity could still bias our results. Such unobserved heterogeneity might result
from firm specific organizational structures, special market condition or man-
agement skills. The difference in difference estimator allows controlling for all
non-random elements of the switching decision that are time invariant and
persistent over time (Smith and Todd, 2005). The remaining unobserved het-
erogeneity is averaged out by the large sample.
The DID estimator compares the difference β between changes between the
average pre- and the post-investment performance of the two groups.
βDiD = 1/Ni
∑
i
∆Yi1 −∆Yi0 −
∑
j
∆Yj1 −∆Yj0 (6)
∆Yi0 and ∆Yi1 denote the growth rate of the performance of switching firms
before and after switching, respectively.
4 Results
4.1 Matching using the whole sample of national firms as control group
First, we present results from event studies and difference in difference esti-
mations of a sample in which switching firms are matched to all firms with
endogenous weight. The advantage of using LLR over the nearest neighbor
regressions techniques is that it generates the correct standard errors through
bootstrapping. The results of the LLR are very close to the nearest neighbor
matching with 3 or 5 nearest neighbor when we use the best matches according
to the propensity score from the whole sample.
Our findings on employment changes at home are comparable to the results
from other studies using Italian firms (Barba Navaretti and Castellani, 2004)
or French firms (Hijzen et al. 2006). The results are given in Table 4.
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The results with respect to employment are similar to the other studies. The
decision to establish a first foreign affiliate affects employment at home posi-
tively. In contrast to the other studies, we find no significant results for output
and productivity growth.
Table 4
Growth of domestic activities: Local linear regressions, standard matching
Period Employment Output Capital TFP
t+1 0.059∗∗ 0.036 0.075∗∗∗ 0.030
(0.023) (0.037) (0.027) (0.022)
t+2 0.096∗∗ -0.020 0.037 -0.048
(0.042) (0.057) (0.064) (0.047)
Switchers t+ 1 99 188 191 89
Controls t+ 1 9,048 42,011 42,272 8,319
Switchers t+ 2 82 143 146 71
Controls t+ 2 5,723 20,226 20,700 5,077
1000 replication bootstrapped standard error in parentheses.
The estimates show that the average effect of the decision to locate activities
abroad on domestic employment is positive. The average growth rate of em-
ployment at home is higher than the average growth rate of the national firms
in the control group. This difference is significant at the 5% level. Concerning
the second year, the differences is also positive and significant at the 5% level.
Growth in capital is significantly positive in the first year after switching and
insignificant in the second. There is no significant effect of the international-
ization decision on output, capital used or total factor productivity (TFP). 2
The results confirm the findings by Barba Navaretti et al. (2006) for French
and Italian firms. The employment effect found for French and for Italian firms
are significantly positive. Additionally, in Barba Navaretti et al. there is also
evidence that Italian firms’ total factor productivity and output are positively
affected by the decision to establish the first affiliate abroad.
Controlling for unobserved time invariant effects by applying a difference in
2Total factor productivity is computed using the methodology of Olley and Pakes
(1996).
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difference estimator changes the results quite a bit. Using this technique, we
can be sure that any effect that might bias the results is canceled by double
differentiating growth rates. We present the results in Table 5. Notice that
we are interested in change of growth rates of the outcomes between both
groups. Moreover, the two groups are no random draws but matched groups
that include ex ante twins. The mean comparison of the two groups show
significantly negative effects on the change in capital growth in both periods.
Productivity growth is positively affected in the first period while change of
employment and output growth remain unaffected.
Table 5
Growth of domestic activities: Local linear regressions, difference in difference
Period Employment Output Capital TFP
t+1 0.099 -0.065 -0.253∗∗∗ 0.113∗∗
(0.130) (0.082) (0.063) (0.047)
t+2 0.146 -0.080 -0.330∗∗∗ -0.087
(0.170) (0.062) (0.100) (0.110)
Switchers t+ 1 56 118 124 50
Controls t+ 1 4,899 19,611 20,120 4,416
Switchers t+ 2 47 100 106 41
Controls t+ 2 3,271 11,512 11,935 2,831
1000 replication bootstrapped standard error in parentheses.
The effect of the decision to establish a first affiliate abroad on employment
is insignificantly positive for both years. We can therefore rule out a negative
effect on employment at home in our sample. Recall that the sample includes a
significant fraction of all firm that decided to become multinational firms over
the period of analysis. The MiDi database comprises all German firms that
hold FDI, 30% of these firms are also in the Dafne database. We are therefore
confident that the estimated effect is the average effect of the establishment
of the first foreign affiliate of German firms on their employment at home.
The effect is non-negative. We do not find any job export from switchers. This
result is in line with the evidence presented for France and Italy.
To get an impression how large are the ”globalization gains” in employment
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implied by the results from the standard matching we look at the absolute
numbers of the group averages. The average switcher in our sample has 2152
employees. After becoming a multinational firm, employment of this group
has grown by 3.1% while employment of the control group, which was shown
to be statistically identical prior to the switching, has fallen by 2.7% in the
first year after switching. The growth difference of 5.9% points amounts to an
absolute average increase of 127 employees per firm. We analyze 99 firms with
employment data for the year of switching and the following year. The total
number of employment growth in the first year in our sample amount thus to
12,573 employees resulting from the decision to become a multinational firm.
In the second year, the additional employment has grown to 206.6 employ-
ees per firm on average, or total employment of 20,453. Assuming that this
growth difference applies to all switching firms, the decision to establish the
first affiliates abroad increases employment in all 936 German parent firms by
118,872 employees in the first year after the decision. This number rises to
193,378 in the second year, which is an impressive number.
4.2 Matching within groups: Controlling for business cycle and sector specific
effects
We present the results from event studies and difference in difference estima-
tion from a sample in which firms are matched using a different matching
procedure. We construct 8 sectors (light industries, heavy industries, machin-
ery, utilities, retail & wholesale, finance, business services, real estate) and
split the sample into 10 years from 1995 onward. Within each sector and for
each year, we match the switcher to their nearest neighbors and recombine the
matches to estimate the average treatment effects on the treated. We apply
a 3 nearest neighbor matching. Using one or five neighbors instead does not
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change qualitatively the results. 3 We report the results of the event study
analysis in Table 6.
Table 6
Growth of domestic activities: 3 Nearest neighbor matching in 80 groups, standard
matching
Period Employment Output Capital TFP
t+1 0.023 -0.014 0.019 -0.028
(0.041) (0.045) (0.035) (0.036)
t+2 0.097 -0.065 -0.026 -0.086
(0.065) (0.065) (0.073) (0.055)
Switchers t+ 1 99 188 191 89
Controls t+ 1 263 505 514 230
Switchers t+ 2 82 143 146 71
Controls t+ 2 212 383 392 184
bootstrapped standard error in parentheses.
The number of firms in the control group is much lower in 3 nearest neighbor
matching than in LLR. Thus, the standard errors in Table 6 are larger than in
Table 4. The differences in the coefficient result from the fact that the group
average of the control group firms differs. The effect of the internationalization
decision of employment is positive but insignificant using the 3 nearest neigh-
bor group specific matching. There are no significantly differences between
the groups for any of the other outcomes. This results from the group specific
matching. 3 nearest neighbor matching using the nearest neighbors from the
whole sample yields results very similar to the LLR above.
In Table 7, we report the results of the difference in difference analysis. The
advantage of this analysis is that it controls for unobserved time constant
characteristics that might be correlated with the internationalization decision.
The disadvantage is that the data requirements is higher, since controlling
for unobserved characteristics requires pre-decision data. Unfortunately, these
data are not available for all firms. Hence, the number of firms in both groups
drops considerably. 4 The estimates show that the average causal effect of
3The results are available upon request
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locating production abroad on employment is positive but not significant in
the first and in the second year after locating activities abroad. Output and
capital growth are significantly negative, in contrast. Total factor productivity
is not significantly affected by the internationalization decision.
Table 7
Growth of domestic activities: Difference in Difference Analysis
Period Employment Output Capital TFP
t+1 0.085 -0.152∗ -0.314∗∗∗ 0.062
(0.158) (0.087) (0.086) (0.083)
t+2 0.097 -0.217∗ -0.408∗∗∗ -0.140
(0.215) (0.117) (0.116) (0.141)
Switchers t+ 1 56 118 124 50
Controls t+ 1 201 350 363 173
Switchers t+ 2 47 100 106 41
Controls t+ 2 168 289 298 146
bootstrapped standard error in parentheses.
Applying group specific matching changes the results of our analysis. The
effects of the decision to establish a first foreign affiliate is less positive. Positive
employment effect turn insignificant and negative effects on output growth
and capital growth emerge. While non-positive effects on capital growth have
also been found in the Italian and French firms’ samples, we find a negative
effect on capital and output growth using the German sample. We believe that
this results is driven by the new matching technique and not by difference in
country characteristics.
Looking at the ”globalization gains” in employment again, we find lower num-
bers. The first year after becoming a multinational firm, employment of switch-
ers has grown by 3.5% while employment of the control group, which was
shown to be statistically identical prior to the switching, has grown only by
1.2% in the first year after switching. The growth difference of 2.3% points
4The difference in the results stems partly from the difference in the methodology
any partly from the change in sample size that results from limitations in the data.
Employing event studies on the smaller sample of the Diff-in-Diff analysis yields
results in between the two presented.
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amounts to an absolute average increase of 49.5 employees per firm. We ana-
lyze 99 firms with employment data for the year of switching and the following
year. The total number of employment growth in our sample amount thus to
4,900 employees resulting from the decision to become a multinational firm.
For all switcher, this amounts to an employment increase of 46,332. In the
second year, this increase rises to additional 195,384 employees in German
parent firms.
5 Sensitive Analysis
In the first subsection, we split the sample with respect to the sector classifi-
cation of the foreign activity. We expect the domestic post-investment perfor-
mance of firms that established a wholesale affiliate or a service unit to differ
from a firm that established a production plant. In the second subsection, we
examine the outcome for switchers that locate activities in Central and East-
ern European countries (CEECs) and those that locate activities in Western
European countries (EU) separately.
5.1 Sample-split with respect to the sector of the foreign affiliate
We expect different post-investment performances for different activities lo-
cated abroad. For instance, we expect output and employment growth to be
positive for switchers that establish a wholesale affiliate or a service unit be-
cause these activities are linked to after-sales activities. In contrast, we would
expect a negative effect on output and employment changes for switchers that
establish affiliates in manufacturing. Relocation of production is likely to be
related to lower employment growth at home.
In Table 8, we present the marginal effects of the decision to become a multi-
20
national firm on employment and output growth for the three groups of firms:
firms with affiliates in manufacturing, in wholesale and in services. The small
size of the samples does not allow for bootstrapped standard deviations in
the difference in difference case. We therefore present only the results of the
standard matching approach.
Table 8
Growth of domestic activities: Sample-split with respect to the sector of the foreign
affiliate, standard matching
Period Manufacturing Wholesales Services
Employment
t+1 0.065 0.061 -0.032
(0.076) (0.093) (0.090)
t+2 0.096 0.167 0.066
(0.134) (0.133) (0.120)
Switchers t+ 1 38 42 36
Controls t+ 1 116 96 114
Switchers t+ 2 25 37 34
Controls t+ 2 86 90 86
Output
t+1 -0.017 -0.032 -0.046
(0.046) (0.084) (0.094)
t+2 0.013 -0.133 -0.093
(0.098) (0.101) (0.124)
Switchers t+ 1 73 76 70
Controls t+ 1 211 214 177
Switchers t+ 2 47 59 57
Controls t+ 2 156 160 136
bootstrapped standard error in parentheses.
After sample split, the sample size is probably too small to find significant
results. Nevertheless, the results are interesting because they show only minor
differences between the different sub-sample. The establishment of a manu-
facturing or a wholesale affiliate has the same (insignificantly) positive effect
on firm’s performance at home. The effect has about the same size as the
positive employment effect found for the whole sample. If anything, the effect
is larger for the two sub-samples. The effects on output are also not in line
with our expectations. There is only one positive effect on output: the effect
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for manufacturing affiliates in the second year. We expected in contrast, the
strongest negative effect for firms establishing a foreign manufacturing unit.
5.2 Sample-split with respect to the host country
There are two reasons to analyze sub-samples for different regions separately.
First, theoretical considerations suggest that locating activities in transition
countries might have very different effects on activities in Germany than locat-
ing activities in other OECD countries because the activities located abroad
differ. Second, the public debate in Germany and the fear expressed is par-
ticularly concentrated on activities in close-by transition countries of Central
and Eastern Europe. Hence, we analyze two sub-samples: firms that locate
activities in CEECs and those that locate activities to EU-15 countries. The
results for employment and output effects are given in Table 9.
The estimates of the effect of internationalization decision do not support the
claim that locating activities in CEECs worsens the employment dynamics
in Germany. There is no difference in the employment growth of firms that
establish an affiliate in CEECs and their control group of national firms. The
estimated effect is positive for the first year and negative for the second. Both
are not statistically significant. The employment effect is positive in both years
and larger in size for activities in EU-15 countries. Thus, the data confirms
our expectations concerning differences with respect to host countries but not
the expectations concerning the negative effect of establishing an affiliate in
CEECs on domestic employment.
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Table 9
Growth of domestic activities: Sample-split with respect to the host country, stan-
dard matching
Period CEECs EU-15 countries
Employment
t+1 0.042 0.050
(0.048) (0.052)
t+2 -0.055 0.138
(0.096) (0.110)
Switchers t+ 1 29 55
Controls t+ 1 67 152
Switchers t+ 2 20 56
Controls t+ 2 50 124
Output
t+1 -0.022 -0.021
(0.054) (0.073)
t+2 -0.020 0.005
(0.105) (0.110)
Switchers t+ 1 46 102
Controls t+ 1 139 280
Switchers t+ 2 38 82
Controls t+ 2 115 204
bootstrapped standard error in parentheses.
6 Conclusion
We find no support to the claim that activities of multinational firms abroad
exports jobs from Germany to the host countries. If anything, we find a positive
effect of the internationalization decision on employment growth at home. This
effect is not significant for all sub-samples but robust in size, and certainly
it does not result from a small number of outliers. We conclude this from a
sample of firms that decided to establish their first affiliate abroad which we
matched to statistically identical firms which did not hold a foreign affiliate
during the whole period analyzed, i.e. from 1997 to 2003. We made sure that
switching firms and control firms from the same year and sector are matched
in our analysis. We used 3 nearest neighbor matching.
Our results are in line with studies from other countries. The direct relation-
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ship between internationalization decision of firms and the high unemployment
in Europe in general and in Germany in particular finds no support in the data.
We do not find evidence for job exports of firms establishing affiliates abroad.
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7 Appendix
Table A1: Descriptive statistics (average performance per group)
Group Multinationals Switchers National firms
ln(Profits) 6.65 6.08 1.79
(4.390) (3.915) (3.079)
ln(Output) 11.40 11.34 4.32
(2.945) (2.365) (5.257)
Age 33.0 21.0 17.3
(36.87) (20.99) (21.79)
Productivity (OP) 2.87 3.03 2.6
(1.390) (1.583) (1.637)
ln(Physical capital 11.43 10.11 3.72
(3.056) (2.455) (5.438)
Debt equity ratio 10.2 50.2 23.1
(132.7) (620.1) (341.5)
ln(Employment) 6.06 6.06 4.75
(1.909) (1.428) (1.833)
standard deviations in parentheses.
Table A2: Bias reduction through matching (group specific means)
Group Switchers Control group National firms
ln(Profits) 6.08 5.89 1.79
(3.915) (4.194) (3.079)
ln(Output) 11.34 11.42 4.32
(2.365) (2.279) (5.257)
Age 21.0 32.2 17.3
(20.99) (34.42) (21.79)
Productivity (OP) 3.03 3.03 2.6
(1.583) (1.320) (1.637)
ln(Physical capital 10.11 10.14 3.72
(2.455) (2.567) (5.438)
Debt equity ratio 50.2 21.8 23.1
(620.1) (189.3) (341.5)
ln(Employment) 6.06 6.05 4.75
(1.428) (1.690) (1.833)
standard deviations in parentheses.
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